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Abstract: This article scrutinizes the legislative
reactions to the Oklahoma City Bombing and
the 2005 London Bombings to try to decipher
why counter-terror legislation was substantially
blocked after these attacks. It finds that the
partisan composition of the government and
executive approval ratings are critical to the
passage of counter-terror laws. In light of the
recent slew of counter-terror legislation passed
worldwide,
cases
where
counter-terror
legislation has been blocked have become
critically important. To this end, this article
asks, “Why does counter-terror legislation get
blocked when it does?” To answer the question,
three variables are tested: partisan composition
of the government, public opinion-based mass
fear levels, and executive approval ratings. To
test the variables, two cases are evaluated: the
passage of diluted counter-terror legislation after
the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995 and after
the 2005 London Bombings. In evaluating the
cases, legislative debates and executive
statements that occurred after the terror attacks
are examined and then compared to cases from
the UK in 1974 and the US in 2001 where
counter-terror legislation quickly passed. The
article concludes that executive approval ratings
and the partisan composition of the government
have the most explanatory power in determining
whether terror attacks will lead to broad counterterror legislation or not.
Keywords: London bombings, counter-terror
legislation, USA, United Kingdom.
______________________

I

n our post-9/11 world, democratic
governments’ responses to terror attacks are
viewed as predictable. An attack occurs, the
polity convulses in a fit of rage and fear, the
© Historia Actual Online 2010

chief executive gathers additional powers for
himself, and civil liberty-abridging counterterror
legislation is easily passed. This supposedly
archetypal response to terrorism is not as
common as many have come to believe. Indeed,
many times the chief executive has attempted to
pass new legislation after a terror attack only to
find himself stifled by the parliament or
legislature. This article explores such cases.
What happens when legislation forwarded by
the executive gets blocked by the legislature
after terrorist attacks? The theory supported
here holds that the executive is presented with
an opportunity by the crisis created by a terrorist
attack, but that he is constrained by levels of
mass fear, public satisfaction ratings, and
political institutions.
This article will be organized in the following
manner. First, the theory will be summarized.
Second, why the passage of counter-terror
legislation should be expected in the UK Blair
case will be examined.
Third, the case of Tony Blair’s own Labour
Party blocking his counter-terror legislation after
the 7 July 2005 London bombings will be
investigated. Fourth, the case of the Oklahoma
City bombing, where the Republican Party
blocked Bill Clinton’s counter-terror legislation
for over a year, will be examined.
The Oklahoma City case will bolster findings
from the Tony Blair case. Finally, conclusions
about why we see variation in the passage of
civil liberty-abridging legislation, the central
question of this study, will be stated.
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1. THE DESCRIPTION OF THEORY
After a terrorist attack occurs, the government
seems to convulse in a quick and forceful
reaction. But the theory that is forwarded and
supported here shows that the process of
reaction is much more complex and that those
reactions vary much more greatly than public
perception holds. As depicted in Figure 1, the
theory begins with the terrorist attack. That
attack is viewed as an exogenous variable, that

is, something that occurs outside of the
governmental process. It gets the process going,
but does not determine how that process will
transpire. An important point made by this
study is that the nature of legislative responses
to terror attacks cannot be predicted by the
nature of the attack or by the number of
fatalities. The limited reaction to the 7 July
bombings in London, the 2004 bombings in
Madrid, and numerous other attacks are
testament
to
that
fact.

Figure 1: The Depiction of the Theory

Attack
Crisis

Executive
Response and
Threat-Shaping

Legislative
Support
(Int.V)

Passage of
Legislation (DV)

Legislative
Opposition
(Int.V)

Enforcement of
Law (DV)

(IV)
X
Public Opinion/
Mass Fear

X
Political
Institutions

The executive’s role, the independent variable,
has two components. First is what I call the
executive response. At this stage the executive
decides generally how to respond to the attack.
He could try to seek new legislation, seek to
deport immigrants (among other options) or
not seek to respond at all. The executive
forwards his plan by employing the second
component of the independent variable:
executive threat-shaping. Executive threatshaping, defined simply as how the
government’s chief executive shapes the terror
threat, is the mechanism by which the
executive pushes his counter-terrorist agenda.
Though this study is focused solely on the civil
implications of this strategy, the way that the
executive attempts to shape the terror threat
colors the state’s international response to
terror as well. Note that a critical distinction in
executive threat-shaping strategies is whether
the leader shapes the threat as an act of war or
a crime.
126

The executive’s response and threat-shaping
strategies are constrained by two broad factors.
First is public opinion/mass fear. In this study,
mass fear levels, public willingness to forego
liberties and executive approval ratings as well
as other factors are measured using public
opinion trend analysis. These factors work
either to constrain or to enable executive
action. The second constraint variable is
political institutions.
This variable
encapsulates the following three factors:
whether a government is run by a presidential
or parliamentary system, level of partisan
competition
and
government
composition/party in power. Though all of
these constraint variables will be looked at,
two will be shown to have especially strong
explanatory power: approval of the executive
and the government’s partisan composition.
The legislature, the theory’s intervening
variable, enters the picture in the next stage of
the process. It can either support or block the
© Historia Actual Online 2010
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executive’s proposed legislation. If it attempts
to block the new counter-terror laws, an
interplay between the executive and legislature
may occur wherein the executive tries to push
the legislature to pass new legislation by
shaping the threat accordingly. This give-andtake is depicted by the dashed line in Figure 1.
The final stage is passage of civil libertyabridging legislation and enforcement of civil
liberty-abridging legislation.
These two
outcomes are the dependent variables of this
theory.
2. WHY SHOULD WE
LEGISLATION TO PASS
LONDON BOMBINGS CASE?

EXPECT
IN THE

Why should we expect counter-terror
legislation to have been passed after the
bombings of 7 July 2005? There are myriad
reasons why we should expect legislation to
have passed in this case. First, in the British
system
the
prime
minister
controls
government. That means that as long as the
prime minister is head of government, all
legislation that he proposes should pass
parliament. Indeed, Tony Blair’s counterterror legislation after the London Bombings,
which sought to prolong detentions for terror
suspects from 14 days to 90 days, was the first

legislation that had been blocked by parliament
in Blair’s eight-plus years in power to that
date.
Second, the Bush administration successfully
passed extensive counter-terror law after the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. If a
system that has many more checks on
executive power was able to pass legislation,
then we can infer that the Blair government
should have been able to push through its bill.
Third, the United Kingdom has a much more
extremist Muslim population than does the
United States. For one, recall the arrests of 24
suspected terrorists who allegedly were
plotting to blow up ten airliners flying from
London to the United States on 10 August
2006.1 Further, a 2006 poll in the London
Telegraph found that 4 in 10 British Muslims
wanted Islamic Law implemented in the
United Kingdom; that same year a poll in the
Sunday Times found that 1 in 5 British
Muslims sympathized with the London
bombers2. Fourth, the UK has passed counterterror legislation many times will be seen later
in this article. Fifth, Britain was at war with
terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan already,
making the case for more domestic strictures
on terrorists, thus, should not have been
difficult.

Table 1: Case Selection Chart
Legislation Quickly Passed

Threat Shaped as War
George W. Bush, 9/11

Threat Shaped as Crime
Yitzchak Rabin, first intifada

Ariel Sharon, second intifada

Legislation Substantially
Blocked

Harold Wilson, 1974
Birmingham bombing
Tony Blair, 7/7/05

Bill Clinton-1995 Oklahoma
City bombing
Bill Clinton-1993 World
Trade Center bombing

Finally, consider the cases in Table 1. As is
evident, most threats that are shaped as war
lead to the quick passage of civil libertyabridging legislation. To these, we could add
many cases, including, for instance, AB
Vajpayee’s passage of the Prevention of
Terrorism Act (PoTA) after the 2001
Parliament bombing in India3, as well as antiterror laws passed in Canada, Australia, New
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Zealand, and Japan after 11 September4. Tony
Blair was the only executive who both shaped
the threat as war and was substantially blocked
in his attempt to pass anti-terror law, making
his case a critically important one.
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Why did the legislature block the Blair
government’s efforts to enact a new set of
counter-terror laws? Before testing the theory
described above, it is worth highlighting that
British parliament has passed civil libertyabridging legislation in the past. For example,
eight days after the Irish Republican Army
(IRA) bombed pubs in Birmingham, killing 21
people and wounding 160, the parliament
adopted the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism
Act.5 At the time, Prime Minister Harold
Wilson plainly described the attacks as an act
of war6. The bill passed through the House of
Commons and House of Lords with
remarkable speed despite the slim majority that
Harold Wilson’s Labour Party enjoyed.
Indeed, the previous month’s election had
given the Labour Party a slim three-seat
majority7.
Parliament’s ability to block Blair’s postLondon Bombings bill is curious because Blair
enjoyed a greater majority in Parliament, the
London Bombings killed significantly more
people, and the new laws Blair proposed would
not have been much different from laws that
had already been passed time and again by
previous governments. One further cannot
argue that Britain was not at war in 2005 and
was in 1974. Both Tony Blair, as will be seen
below, and Harold Wilson shaped the terrorist
threat as a war, and British forces are today
still at war in Iraq and Afghanistan with
Islamist extremists.
3.1. The Attacks
On the morning of 7 July 2005, as rush hour
was drawing to a close, a series of explosions
carried out by radical jihadist suicide bombers
hit the London public transportation system.
At 8:50 a.m. a bomb exploded on a subway
train leaving Edgware Road station killing
seven people and wounding 40. At the same
time, a bomb exploded on a train traveling
between Liverpool Street and Aldgate Station
killing ten people and wounding over a
hundred. In the deadliest attack of the day,
also on the tube and also at 8:50 a.m., 27
people were killed and dozens injured when a
bomb exploded on the Piccadilly line train near
King’s Cross station. About an hour later, at
9:47 a.m., a bomb exploded on the upper deck
of the No. 30 bus as it traveled through
128

Tavistock Square; fourteen people were killed
and dozens wounded8. All told, 56 people,
including the four bombers, were killed and
over 700 wounded due to the attacks on July 7,
20059. Two weeks later to the day, on July 21,
2005, four more bombers failed to carry out an
identical attack targeting three underground
stations and a bus.
The bombers were
thwarted by the failure of their bombs to fully
explode10.
The first reports about the bombings held that
the attackers were Britons of Pakistani origin
who were born, raised and radicalized in the
United Kingdom11. But whereas three of the
bombers were British nationals of Pakistani
origin who lived in West Yorkshire (the fourth
was a Jamaican-born British national), their
radicalization had strong foreign connections12.
Two of the bombers visited Pakistan in 2004.
Further, an al-Qaeda member that had entered
England via a Channel port two weeks before
the blasts, left Britain a few hours before the
bombings. Moreover, the explosives used in
the bombings were similar to those used by alQaeda13. A year after the bombings, alQaeda’s spiritual leader Ayman al-Zawahiri
claimed that two of the bombers had been
trained for suicide operations at an al-Qaeda
camp14.
Though there are tensions between Britain’s
Muslim and Christian populations, the attacks
were not as “home-grown” as initially
reported.
Indeed, terrorism analyst Peter
Bergen stated a year after the bombings that,
“the London attacks were a classic al-Qaeda
operation and not the work of self-starting
terrorists as has been repeatedly suggested in
the media”15. It turns out, then, that this was
one case of international terrorism that was
framed by the media as an attack by local
elements. The response to the London attacks,
thus, may have been more muted due to this
local-framing by the media (as opposed to the
media framing the attack as perpetrated by
foreign forces and part of a larger war)16. As
will be seen below, this media framing had
little to do with how Tony Blair sought to
shape the threat.
3.2. Executive Response
At the time of the bombings, Tony Blair was
hosting the meetings of the Group of Eight (G8) in Scotland. That day, he made a statement
framing the threat of terrorism as war, stating:
© Historia Actual Online 2010
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“It is important … that those engaged in
terrorism realize that our determination to
defend our values and our way of life is greater
than their determination to cause death and
destruction to innocent people in a desire to
impose extremism on the world. Whatever
they do, it is our determination that they will
never succeed in destroying what we hold dear
in this country and in other civilized nations
throughout the world”17.
Blair’s statement framed the conflict against
terror as a worldwide one. He implied that the
world was entangled in a war between
civilized nations and extremist terrorists. The
threat magnitude was thus large, but, Blair
suggested, the government would protect its
people.
Three days later Blair made a speech wherein
he spoke of his “revulsion” at the terrorist
attacks. Blair outlined what had transpired
during the attacks and named the probable
perpetrators as “Islamic extremist terrorists, of
the kind who over recent years have been
responsible for many innocent deaths in
Madrid, Bali, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Kenya,
Tanzania, Pakistan, Yemen, Turkey, Egypt[,]
Morocco” and on 11 September. Blair asked
for additional anti-terror legislation, noting that
Parliament had already pledged to pass further
counter-terror legislation earlier in the year.
He also set the tone for future statements when
he stated that, “If, as the fuller picture about
these incidents emerges and the investigation
proceeds, it becomes clear that there are
powers which the police and intelligence
agencies need immediately to combat
terrorism, it is plainly sensible to reserve the
right to return to Parliament with an
accelerated timetable.” He closed by lauding
the Muslim community of Britain saying that,
“We will work with you to make the moderate
and true voice of Islam heard as it should
be”18. Blair’s statements framed the conflict as
one between innocent civilians and Islamic
extremists, he stated that liberty-security
tradeoffs would have to be made, and that
Muslims in England should be tolerated.
Blair’s linking of the 7 July attacks to 11
September and other terror attacks from around
the world, implied a high magnitude of threat.
Two weeks after the London bombings, Blair
stated that he would not give “one inch” to
terrorists and that he sought to confront them
© Historia Actual Online 2010
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on “every level.”
He also stated that,
“September 11 for me was a wake up call. Do
you know what I think the problem is? That a
lot of the world woke up for a short time and
then turned over and went back to sleep
again.” Meanwhile, Conservative Party leader,
and head of Blair’s opposition, stated that,
“One of the principle objectives of the
terrorists is to divide us, one from another. So
far … they have failed in that objective. …
[W]e believe it is so important that we
approach these difficult issues in a spirit of
consensus, with the objective of reaching
agreement wherever we possibly can”19. This
speech was Blair’s most urgent yet and it
framed the threat as an urgent issue that cannot
be ignored. It is important to note that at this
stage, Tory rhetoric supported Blair.
Three and a half months after the London
bombings, the Blair government unveiled new
counter-terror legislation that would allow the
British government to detain terror suspects for
three months without charge, make the
glorification or encouragement of terrorism an
offense, and outlaw attending terror training
camps in the UK or abroad. The proposed bill
would have greatly affected free speech in
Britain. According to Guardian columnist
Seamus Milne, “under the terms of the bill,
anyone who voices support for armed
resistance to any state or occupation, however
repressive or illegitimate, will be committing a
criminal offense carrying a seven-year prison
sentence”20. The legislation was introduced
about one month after a video of one of the 7
July bombers was released that linked him to
al-Qaeda21.
3.3. Legislative Opposition
In this section, Blair’s attempts to pass a 90day detention will be focused on. Blair
received strong opposition to his legislation
almost immediately after he presented it. On 3
November 2005, Blair made the case for his
legislation by stating that, “We have got to
decide whether the civil liberties of people
who are terrorism suspects should come before
the civil liberties of the vast majority of people
in this country. I say the civil liberties of those
law abiding people should come first.” Blair’s
legislation was already struggling to pass due
to a coalition between ministers of parliament
on the right and the left that were fed up with
Tony Blair’s rule22.
The Conservatives,
Liberal Democrats, and Labour rebels that
129
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opposed Blair’s legislation proffered
compromise: a 28-day detention period23.

Gabriel Rubin

a

Blair convinced Labour MP David Winnick to
re-table the “rebel” Terrorism Bill amendment
that would have set the detention limit at 28
days. Still, ministers in Blair’s own party were
disappointed with the Prime Minister’s
legislation and criticized him by saying that his
politics were not in line with those of the
Labour Party24. By 6 November 2005, Blair
was convinced that his legislation would not
pass. He withdrew negotiations on the 90-day
limit and told the Home Secretary, Charles
Clarke, to seek a compromise over the
detention issue, as well as over separate plans
to criminalize religious hatred and outlaw the
glorification of terrorism25.
After attempts to magnify the terrorist threat
once again backfired—Blair called the
potential blocking of the 90-day detention, a
“defeat for the security of the country” and
accused
Parliament
of
“woeful
complacency”—the Prime Minister finally
accepted that his bill would not pass26. Yet the
very next day, on 8 November 2005, Blair
once again tried to push through the 90-day
detention limit, this time with a sunset clause.
The Prime Minister stated that, “If we are
forced to compromise, it will be a compromise
with this nation’s security.” Blair pointed to a
Times (of London) poll that found that 64% of
the British public supported the 90-day rule.
The head of the Conservative Party, Michael
Howard countered that, “if you want to look
for a precedent for 90 days, I suggest you find
it in the apartheid regime in South Africa when
the 90-day rule was one of the most notorious
aspects of that regime”27.
It is important to note here that Blair’s strategy
for passing his terrorism legislation included
repeatedly pointing to the fact that the police
requested the 90-day detention limit. In
essence, Blair was arguing that it was not he
who desired this law, but rather heads of police
that had asked for it. This strategy was
ineffective as it shifted the process from one of
an executive demanding legislation from the
legislature to one of the executive asking the
legislature, on behalf of experts, for legislation.
Further, Parliament never fully understood
why the police “required” the 90-day detention
limit28. Effectively, Blair had stopped pushing
the anti-terror legislation as a solution to a
threat and, instead, was pushing the legislation
130

as a tactical tool to help law enforcement. This
formulation of the threat proved weak as it was
easier for ministers of parliament to oppose the
police than it was to oppose Blair and the
public he purportedly represented.
The
reasoning behind Blair’s bill was hidden in a
letter from Andy Hayman, the assistant
commissioner for the Metropolitan Police,
rather than pronounced publicly and repeatedly
by the Prime Minister29.
As expected, Blair’s counter-terror legislation
was blocked—the first legislation Blair had
proposed in eight-plus years of power to be
blocked—when 49 members of his own party
joined the opposition to defeat the bill. In its
stead, Parliament passed the 28 day detention
limit proposal30. Statements such as those of
one Tory Member of Parliament who shouted,
“We aren’t a police state” trumped Blair’s calls
that the 90-day limit was necessary to protect
the country from terrorism31. The fallout from
the blocked passage of Blair’s anti-terror bill
eventually led to Tony Blair’s resignation,
which he announced would occur within a year
on 7 September 200632.
3.4. What Happened?
How did Tony Blair’s own party block his
anti-terror legislation? In order to answer this
question, we will now examine each variable
described in Figure 1 to decipher the main
cause behind Tony Blair’s counterintuitive
fate. As detailed above, the independent
variable in this article’s theory is executive
response and threat-shaping. Blair clearly tried
to push a civil liberty-reducing response and
did so by shaping the terror threat as a broad
and urgent one. He continued to forward this
response months after the 90-day detention
period was turned down by parliament. For
example, on March 21, 2006, Blair made a
speech where he framed the battle between
terrorists and democracies as “a clash about
civilization.” He stated that, “this is not a
clash between civilizations. It is a clash about
civilization. It is the age-old battle between
progress and reaction, … between optimism
and hope on the one hand; and pessimism and
fear on the other”33. So, Blair did push
counter-terror legislation and he did frame the
terror threat accordingly. Still, he faced strong
legislative opposition, had to fall back on using
the police as an excuse for his counterterror
agenda, and finally was thwarted in his antiterror efforts.
© Historia Actual Online 2010
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Could the institution of parliamentary
government have been the cause of Blair’s
demise? As established above, this cannot be
the case.
Parliamentary political systems
actually allow prime ministers to pass law
much more easily than executives in
presidential systems. Moreover, the analysis in
a previous study on the variant responses of
presidential and parliamentary systems’
reactions to terror attacks34, showed few
differences if any between the two systems’
responses to terrorism. Furthermore, counterterror laws have been repeatedly passed in
Britain and have passed quite quickly, as seen
in the above case on the 1974 Prevention of
Terrorism Act. The only way that prime
ministers can have their legislation blocked is
if they lose their ruling coalitions. In this case,

it appears that Blair lost his, despite the
continuation of Labour rule. But it was not
due to institutional constraints. Next let us turn
to findings on public opinion and mass fear.
First, did the public desire that the government
gain extra-police powers after the July 7, 2005
bombings? The answer is yes. An ICM/ News
World survey polled respondents using the
following prompt: “There are a number of
people living in Britain who the authorities
have identified as posing a potential terrorist
threat. Do you think extra powers should or
should not be made available to deport or
detain them?” As Figure 2 demonstrates, 88%
of respondents to the 17 July 2005 poll said
that their government should have extra
powers to deport or detain terrorists, or to do
both.

Figure 2. UK Extra Police Powers

UK Extra Police Powers Post July 7, 2005

40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
deport

detain

both

An alternate explanation for the blocked
legislation may be that fear levels did not rise
after the attacks. After all, many pundits
pointed to the famed “stiff upper lip” of
Londoners and their stoic, balanced response
to terrorism35. Yet, as Figure 3 demonstrates,
mass fear levels in Britain did rise after the

© Historia Actual Online 2010
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London bombings by 20 percentage points36.
Though fear levels receded precipitously
within a year of the attacks, this drawdown of
fear levels is a common occurrence. Mass fear
levels after terror attacks occur generally spike
and then recede. Therefore, Britons responded
rather typically to this terror attack37.
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Figure 3. Percent Fearful of Terrorism in UK, 2004-2006
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Figure 4. Blair: Approval Rating, 1997-2007
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The important poll figure in explaining this
case is Blair’s approval rating. Figure 4
compiles data acquired from the Ipsos-MORI
Political Monitor on the Prime Minister’s
approval ratings. Surprisingly, Blair saw no
rally ‘round the leader effect’ after the 7 July 7
bombings. His approval ratings, already at
39%, moved upward slightly due to the
bombings but then dipped back down to 39% a
month later. Without sufficient public support,
Blair did not have a strong enough mandate to
pass further civil liberty reductions. Notice in
Figure 4 Blair did see a surge in his support
after the 11 September 11 attacks. Thus, not
all terror attacks yield increased support for the
executive.
3.5. Contributing Factors: Executive
Mandate and Previous Legislation
There are two other contributing factors for the
failure of Blair’s post-London bombings antiterror legislation. The first is that in addition
to Blair’s low approval ratings, he did not have
a strong mandate. Though it is true that the
partisan composition of the House of
Commons clearly favored the Prime Minister,
as Labour held the majority in parliament, his
132

party was not behind him. Statements like
those above about Blair’s actions not being
indicative of the Labour Party’s platform are
testament to that fact; so too, of course, is the
fact that Blair’s own ministers of parliament
voted against him on the anti-terror bill.
Though Blair’s approval ratings had been low
for at least a year before the bombings, his
party may have felt pressure from the
opposition due to its recent electoral gains.
Indeed, Labour had lost 47 parliamentary seats
in the 2005 election. The election losses,
coupled with the Blair’s low approval ratings,
drove home the fact that the British public was
growing weary of Blair’s rule of Labour; his
mandate, thus, was weak and his party chose to
stand against him for this reason.
A second reason why Blair’s legislation was
blocked is that anti-terror legislation had just
been contentiously passed in March 2005. The
March legislation made house arrests for terror
suspects, without charge or trial, legal38. These
house arrests, called control orders, forbid a
terror suspect from using the phone or
Internet39. The control order law came into
effect only after raucous debate in the House of
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Commons and a rare hold-up in the House of
Lords40.
Blair’s leadership of the Labour Party had
basically become synonymous with the new
“security state” that Great Britain had become.
His parliament passed the 2005 Serious
Organized Crime and Police Act, which
prohibited protestors from demonstrating
within one kilometer of Parliament. He also
spearheaded the creation of the national system
of license-plate recognition cameras and, in
2006, the national identity card system41.
Under Blair, certainly due to the very real
threat of terrorism, Britain has become a
surveillance state, in which there is one closedcircuit TV camera for every 14 citizens42.
Blair’s rule had incrementally, but radically
changed the nature of government in Britain;
government was now more pervasive, intrusive
and powerful. The public’s distaste for this
outcome was made clear in the debates over
the 2005 pre-London bombings terror bill, and
eventually led to the defection of Labour Party
members and the ouster of Tony Blair. Blair’s
weak mandate, exhibited most obviously in his
low approval ratings but also in Labour Party
electoral losses, and previous legislative
actions led to the blocked passage of his antiterror legislation.
4. THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING
Let us now turn to a second case of counterterror legislation being substantially blocked
by a legislature in order to assess the results of
the London Bombings case. The subsequent
case examines the blocked passage of
President William Clinton’s counter-terror
legislation after the 19 April 1995 Oklahoma
City bombing. Like in the previous case,
compromise legislation was eventually passed,
in the form of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDP) of 1996. Still, the
AEDP was not passed until a year after the
Oklahoma City bombing—and three years
after the first World Trade Center bombing.
Here I examine the Oklahoma City bombing
looking at executive threat-shaping after the
bombing, the legislative debate that transpired,
the content of the counterterror legislation
proposed, and the reasons for the stalled
passage of the post-terror attack legislation.

© Historia Actual Online 2010
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The case will be examined, once again, by
going through the variables the theory
described above.
4.1. Executive Threat-Shaping: A Moving
Target
On the morning of April 19, 1995 at 9:03am,
Timothy McVeigh, an anti-government
extremist, drove a rented Ryder truck full of
homemade explosive into the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma. The resulting explosion destroyed
half of the nine-story federal building and
damaged twenty-five surrounding buildings. It
also took the lives of 168 people and wounded
674 more43. The Oklahoma City bombing was
the largest terrorist attack to date on US soil.
In the immediate hours after the Oklahoma
City bombing, Middle Eastern terrorists were
thought to have been the perpetrators of the
attack. In fact, it was reported on the CBS
Evening News that a government source had
stated that the bombing had, “Middle Eastern
terrorism written all over it”44. As will be
shown below, the fact that a white, US-born,
anti-government extremist was behind the
attack drastically changed the way in which
Clinton framed the threat. Instead of calling
for a war against terrorists, Clinton called for
the crimes of a narrow group of antigovernment extremists to be contained.
Clinton’s framing of the threat as a crime
clearly did not make his proposed counterterror legislation appear urgent.
On 21 April 1995, Clinton made broad threats
against the potential bombers, calling the
bombing, “an attack on the United States.” He
declared that he would consider military
retaliation if the bombers turned out to be
foreigners. “There is no place to hide,”
Clinton announced. “Nobody can hide any
place in this country, nobody can hide any
place in this world, from the terrible
consequences of what has been done”45. Still,
Clinton preached tolerance stating: “This is not
a question of anyone’s country of origin. This
is not a question of anybody’s religion. This
was murder, this was evil”46. Counter-terror
legislation had already been introduced in
February
1995
under
the
Omnibus
Counterterrorism Act, but the bill had stalled in
Congress; now it appeared that passage of new
counter-terror legislation would be inevitable47.
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Four days after the bombing, with the news out
that the perpetrator was not a Muslim but
rather a right-wing extremist, Clinton spoke in
Oklahoma City at the post-bombing memorial
prayer service. He tried to calm the families of
the victims by recalling the words of a widow
whose husband was murdered when Pan
American flight 103 was bombed in 1988. She
said that, “The hurt you feel must not be
allowed to turn into hate, but instead into the
search for justice.” But only a few paragraphs
later, Clinton asserted that, “one thing we owe
those who have sacrificed [i.e., the victims] is
the duty to purge ourselves of the dark forces
which gave rise to this evil.”
Clinton
continued to frame the conflict as one between
regular Americans and members of irrational
hate-groups. He was not attempting to shape
the threat as a war, but rather as an important
internal struggle between those Americans
who follow the rule of law and those who
believe it does not apply to them. Indicative of
his even-keeled message, Clinton declared
that, “we will stand against the forces of fear.
When there is talk of hatred, let us stand up
and talk against it”48. The importance of the
conflict seemed to recede as Clinton now
assailed militia groups, right-wing extremists
and even “the influence centers in our
culture—the entertainment industry, the sports
industry”49.
Clinton’s blunted rhetoric was also present in a
5 May 1995 speech at Michigan State
University in which he defended the American
government, arguing that Americans have
more freedom than most people in the world,
and recanted the limits on government imposed
by the Constitution. He further stated that,
“Our founding fathers created a system of laws
in which reason could prevail over fear”50.
That said, he continued to state that Americans
were vulnerable due to the existence of “evil”
ultra-right paramilitary groups and pushed the
terror threat as one with a great magnitude. He
did this by playing on Americans’ worst fears,
“No one is free in an America where parents
have to worry when they drop off their
children for day care, or when you are the
target of assassination simply because you
work for the government,” he said51.
Even with the threat shaped as a crime that
needed to be contained, the passage of libertyabridging counter-terror laws appeared certain
after the bombing52. Yet, an April 24, 1995
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Irish Times article that doubted the passage of
Clinton’s new law proved prescient. It stated:
“while the mood in the US can be compared to
that in Britain in 1974 when parliament rushed
through the Prevention of Terrorism Act in the
wake of the Birmingham bombings, it is by no
means certain the Republican majority in
Congress will favor a curtailing of civil
liberties, especially when targeted against
groups that are more likely to have Republican
sympathies”53.
4.2. The Proposed Legislation and the 1996
Antiterrorism Act
Before delving into the year-long debate
between the President and Congress over new
antiterror legislation, let us first look at the
content of the legislation that Clinton
proposed, and that was eventually passed.
Looking at the legislation here will provide
context for the legislative debate that
transpired. Clinton’s proposed counter-terror
legislation contained the following provisions
that made it into the final legislation, which
was passed one year after the Oklahoma
bombing.
The 1996 Antiterrorism Act, “established a
special court that would use secret evidence to
deport noncitizens accused of association with
terrorist groups; it gave the executive branch
the power to criminalize fundraising for lawful
activities conducted by organizations labeled
‘terrorist’; it repealed the Edwards amendment,
which prohibited the FBI from opening
investigations based on First Amendment
activities; and it resurrected the discredited
ideological visa denial provisions of the [1952]
McCarran-Walter Act to bar aliens based on
their associations rather than their acts”54.
The legislation allowed the FBI to gather
information more freely on paramilitary
groups55, but increased wiretapping authority
was blocked by Republicans in Congress who
were worried about the curtailment of civil
liberties56.
Basically, the act allowed the Department of
State to designate groups as “terrorist,” and
thus made granting visas to their members and
providing these groups with humanitarian aid
or donations a crime57. Americans banks
would also have to freeze the funds of the
members of any organization deemed as
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terrorist58.
Further, under the Act the
government could “invoke … secret evidence
provisions whenever the attorney general
determine[d] that public disclosure of the
evidence against an alleged ‘alien terrorist’
would ‘pose a risk to the national security of
the United States or the security of any
person’”59. The bill impacted mainly Muslims
who were accused of association with terrorist
groups60.
4.3. The Debate: Republicans Defend Civil
Liberties
against
Security-Minded
Democrats
With the terror threat shaped as a marginal
one, Clinton’s anti-terror legislation, originally
proposed in February 1995, appeared out of
place. The President was harping on the threat
of hate speech and right-wing zealots61, while
forwarding legislation that made it easier to
deport immigrants allegedly linked to terror
groups62. Five days after the bombing, the
Senate passed a symbolic resolution
condemning the bombing and praising the
President for the rapid aid he helped the
victims receive. The resolution also vowed
that the Senate would “expeditiously approve”
new counter-terrorism legislation63. On April
27, 1995, the Senate leaders of the majority
Republican Party introduced an updated antiterror bill to the judiciary committee.
Amending the previously proposed counterterror bill, the new, proposed bill would add
tags made of microscopic particles to raw
materials that could be used for bomb making,
allow the military to participate in domestic
criminal cases, give the FBI more leeway in
conducting electronic surveillance, and stiffen
penalties for attacks on federal employees64.
Though the American public was in a state of
fear and Clinton was pushing new legislation,
Republican Senator Bob Dole, the majority
leader in the Senate, counseled patience. Dole
stated, on an ABC news program, his view
that, “we better move slowly on the legislation
we’re considering, make certain we get it right
so we can sit here a year form now … and say
we did the right thing … instead of getting
caught up in emotion and going too far and
maybe end up trampling on” an innocent
person or group’s rights65. In response to the
Republican Party’s sense of calm, Clinton
publicly argued on 2 May 1995 that America’s
open society was vulnerable “to the forces of
organized evil,” while U.S. Treasury officials
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asked Congress for increased funding and legal
authority to combat what they described as a
war on the federal government66. By the end
of the month, Clinton declared that, “Congress
has a right to review this legislation to make
sure the civil liberties of American citizens are
not infringed … but they should not go slow.
Terrorists do not go slow, my fellow
Americans.
Their agenda is death and
destruction on their own timetable”67. In
response, Senator Dole threatened to “pull
down” the counter-terror bill if President
Clinton did not rein in Democrats who had
added 67 amendments to it68.
Three days later, on 7 June 1995, seven weeks
after the Oklahoma City bombing, the Senate
overwhelmingly
passed
Bill
Clinton’s
counterterror legislation in a 91-8 vote69. The
bill contained a key provision fought for by
Republicans that limited the appeals of death
row inmates in Federal courts70. Two weeks
later, the House Judiciary Committee approved
the legislation71, but it would rot in the House
for a year before it would finally be passed. A
coalition of far-right and far-left members of
the House of Representatives stymied the bill
on grounds of civil liberties and gun ownership
rights72.
Clinton’s anti-terrorism bill had been heralded
by House Democrats, such as Dick Gephardt,
who stated on 15 May1995: “We must do more
than merely convicting those responsible for
this horrific act of violence, and bringing them
to swift and certain punishment. We must
serve warning to all who would use extremist
means to advance their extremist ideas: We
will use the full force of our laws to find them,
to punish them, and to rid our society of their
hateful acts. And when those laws aren't
enough, we'll write tough new laws to rein in
their wanton bloodshed and terrorism.”73
While House Republicans counseled patience,
some Democrats repeatedly stated that the
passage of new counter-terror legislation was
both necessary and urgent74.
Despite the Democrats’ claims of urgency, an
unlikely coalition of special interest groups
made up of the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), the National Rifle Association
(NRA), and Arab and Muslim groups, joined
together to block the bill in the House. House
Republicans were also uneasy about passing a
bill aimed against anti-government libertarians
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and gun owners. Meanwhile, House Judiciary
Committee chairman Henry Hyde (a
Republican) excised the legislation of its
roving wiretap provision and tucked into it
Republican Party Contract with America crime
provisions that relaxed laws on habeas corpus
and allowed for speedier death penalties75.

World Trade Center bombing, the original
cause for the proposed legislation, as well as
the 1993 siege of the Branch Davidians in
Waco, Texas. Instead, the President pointed
fingers at right-wing personalities such as Rush
Limbaugh and at the right to bear arms, a
strategy which alienated the majority
Republican Congress.

On March 13, 1995, the Republican House
majority voted 246-171 to weaken Clinton’s
antiterrorism bill. House members said that
they feared the federal government more than
they feared terrorists76. Finally, the anti-terror
legislation, now called the Anti-terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, was
passed by the House on 15 April 1996.
Democratic Representative Charles Schumer
complained that, “this bill should be called the
better-than-nothing anti-terrorism bill”77. In his
weekly radio address, the President bitterly
complained that House Republicans had gutted
the counter-terror bill, largely by removing its
provision for roving wiretaps “under pressure
from the Washington gun lobby”78. The House
gave its final approval for the bill in a
bipartisan 293-133 vote on 18 April. Rep.
Henry Hyde stated that the compromise
legislation, “maintains the delicate balance
between freedom and order”79. Five days after
the one-year anniversary of the Oklahoma City
bombing,
Clinton
signed
the
new
counterterrorism bill80.

On the public opinion front, mass fear levels
were high after the Oklahoma City bombing,
but the nature of public opinion surveys makes
it difficult to tell whether or not there was a
bump in mass fear levels. At best, available
data allows us to surmise that there was a rise
in fear levels after the bombing and
conclusively state that fear levels were high.
This is because polling on terrorism tends to
occur after terror attacks occur. That said, as
Brigitte Nacos notes, terrorism rises and
recedes very quickly as a salient issue in the
mind of Americans. She notes that after the
1985 TWA hijacking, 13 percent of Americans
saw terrorism as the most important problem
facing their country according to a CBS/New
York Times survey, whereas six months earlier
terrorism had not been mentioned at all as an
important problem facing America and six
months later, less than 1 percent of respondents
mentioned terrorism when faced with the same
query81.
Figure 5 combines data from polls asking
Americans about whether they personally felt
danger from terrorism82. It clearly shows a rise
in terror fears after Oklahoma City, though
obviously not as high as the fear levels after
the attacks of 11 September. Note that the first
poll in Figure 1 was conducted after the first
attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. In
addition to this data, polls asking Americans
how worried they were that they or someone in
their family would become victims of terrorism
found that 42 percent of Americans were very
or somewhat worried about this scenario in
April 1995, a figure which receded to 35
percent a year later and 27 percent two years
later83.
Moreover, in the days after the
Oklahoma
bombing,
84
percent
of
Massachusetts residents polled by The Boston
Herald believed that is was “very likely” or
“somewhat likely” that an incident similar to
the Oklahoma City bombing would occur in
the US in the next few years84. It is safe to say,
then, that fear levels were high after the
Oklahoma City bombing.

4.4. Why Was Clinton’s Anti-terror
Legislation Blocked for One Year?
There are numerous reasons for why it took
Clinton’s proposed anti-terror legislation over
one year to pass through Congress. We will
evaluate those reasons looking first at
executive response and threat-shaping, then
public opinion and mass fear, and finally
institutional variables. The way in which
President Clinton shaped the terror threat
certainly hurt his legislation’s cause. He
shaped the threat as a crime and though he
continually spoke to the urgency of the terror
threat, his framing of the conflict as one
between law-abiding Americans and antigovernment hate groups and right-wing
extremists did not resonate with Congress or
the public. One might argue that he had no
choice in shaping the threat as such, but he
could have pointed more often to the 1993
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Figure 5
US Mass Fear Levels 1993-2002
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There was also a public demand for
government action after the Oklahoma
bombing. This is indicated by polls that show
that Americans were willing to trade liberties
for security after the Oklahoma City bombing.
An April 1995 Los Angeles Times survey
found that 49 percent of Americans thought
that it was necessary for the average person to
give up civil liberties in order to bolster
security after the Oklahoma City bombing
compared to 43 percent who thought that
curbing liberties was unnecessary.
Just as in the previous case, however, approval
ratings were not in the executive’s favor.
President Clinton’s approval rating after the
Oklahoma City bombing was a paltry 45
percent according to the Harris Interactive poll.
Moreover, Clinton’s approval ratings saw no
‘rally effect’ after the terrorist incident in
Oklahoma. Indeed, his average approval rating
for 1995 was 47%, similar to his 46% average
rating from the previous year85. Here it is
important to emphasize that once again
approval ratings seem to have played a big part
in determining the fate of an executive’s
counterterror legislation.
All three political constellation variables
contributed in explaining why Clinton was
unable to push through his counter-terror bill
through Congress.
Recalling that these
variables are legislative composition, party
competition and political institution, let us look
at the first one. In 1994, President Clinton’s
party lost more seats than in any midterm
election since 1946: Democrats lost 54 seats
and control of House for the first time in 40
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years as well as nine Senate seats86. The
historic shift of power emboldened the GOP to

challenge Clinton, and also was indicative of a
weak executive mandate. Party competition,
as measured by temporal proximity to an
election, also had something to do with why
the legislation was blocked, as 1996 was a
presidential election year and the head of
Senate Republicans, Bob Dole, was running
for president. Finally, the bicameral nature of
the American legislature played a strong role
in halting the quick passage of counter-terror
legislation. As explained above, the Senate
quickly passed Clinton’s anti-terror bill after
Oklahoma City, but the House halted its
passage for a full year. Although many
scholars have posited that presidential systems
are more likely to lead to abuses of power, due
to the presence of a more powerful executive87,
here the legislative-executive antagonism
inherent in the American system and
particularly the existence of the bicameral
legislature served as a strong check against
executive power.
CONCLUSION
In the majority of cases where large terrorist
attacks lead to executives pushing for broad
counterterror legislation, the executives get
their way. The cases in this article exhibited
the value of the following five factors. First,
executive threat-shaping was once against
bolstered as the independent variable in
pushing counterterror legislation. Though both
Clinton and Blair were blocked in their initial
pursuits of legislation, they both eventually got
most of what they wanted from their respective
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legislatures though with a time delay. Shaping
the terror threat as a law enforcement issue, or
a crime, proved to be a hindrance to passing
anti-terror law. Both Clinton and, at times,
Blair framed the terror threat as a criminal
matter and this framing simply made the threat
appear less urgent and important. Second, also
bolstering the importance of the executive in
pushing post-terror attack responses, executive
approval ratings proved to be critical in
determining whether or not anti-terror laws
would be passed. Neither case saw a rally
‘round the leader’ effect after the terror attack
and both leaders examined had poor approval
ratings both before and after the attacks. That
said, mass fear levels, though a constant across
cases, were clearly important in pushing the
threat.
Third, the executive’s mandate proved to be
particularly important in these cases. Even
with a favorable partisan composition of the
government, Blair’s mandate was weak given
poor election results and a poor approval
rating. Clinton’s mandate, also given poor
election results and a poor approval rating, was
also weak. Fourth, political competition was
heightened in the Clinton case, and arguably in
the Blair case.
For Clinton, impending
elections emboldened opposition Republicans.
For Blair, growing unrest within the Labour
Party and calls for Gordon Brown to replace
him as leader of the party created internal
political competition.
Finally, political
institutions,
previously
found
to
be
unimportant in the passage of counterterror
legislation, were critical in shaping the
Oklahoma City bombing case. The bicameral
nature of the American legislature, rather than
the presence of an office of the executive,
created a strong and sufficient check on Bill
Clinton’s counterterror bill.

Given these findings, the above theory can be
revised to look as it does below. In Figure 6,
all of the variables remain the same with the
exception of the constraint variables that
appear below the executive response and
threat-shaping independent variable. Instead
of generally showing public opinion and mass
fear levels constraining the executive, it has
now been shown that executive approval
ratings and mass fear levels constrain
executive action. Furthermore, the political
institutions variable has exhibited that
proximity to elections, composition of
government, temporary right-left government
coalitions, and bicameral legislatures can
stymie the passage of anti-terror legislation.
The political institutions variable is here
revised as political competition and number of
checks on the executive. Political competition
means both temporal proximity to election and
internal competition within a party that, in a
parliamentary system of government, may lead
to a leadership change or the calling of a new
election. Checks on government can come in
the form of a bicameral legislature, a
temporary coalition, or an opposition party
controlling the legislature. Other cases may
show that other checks are important, but it is
clear that the more checks on the executive, the
harder it will be for him to pass legislation.
That said, these checks, such as the partisan
composition of the legislature and temporary
coalitions, are not necessarily etched into
institutions. Rather some are institutional but
most are borne out of the regular legislative
process. By defining this constraint variable as
“political competition and number of checks,”
I have taken account of the findings made here
while allowing for future idiosyncratic
outcomes in other cases.

Figure 6: Revised Theory
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Although stating that increased checks on
government executives can stop civil libertyabridging legislation sounds heartening, most
of the time counterterror laws get quickly
passed after major terror attacks. The main
factor behind the blocked passage of counterterror laws appears to be weak executive
mandates, which allowed existing checks to
take effect and new checks—in the form of
right-left coalitions—to form. It remains to be
seen whether a strong, well-liked executive can
be blocked in his pursuit of liberty-reducing
laws after a terror attack. Perhaps increased
awareness about the debate surrounding trades
of liberty-for-security in response to terrorism
will embolden both members of government
legislatures and their publics to stop chief
executives from passing liberty-abridging
laws. But what may ultimately be necessary is
the rise of government leaders who have the
strength to counsel patience and emphasize the
values of our liberties after terror attacks occur.
After all, terror attacks are fleeting, though
terrible and tragic, events. But, the loss of
liberties they too frequently portend can be
permanent.
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